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  March	  2012	  Draft	  of	  a	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  forthcoming	  in	  A	  Companion	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Time,	  edited	  by	  Adrian	  Bardon	  and	  Heather	  Dyke,	  Wiley	  Blackwell	  2013.	  Please	  cite	  that	  version.	  	  	   Time	  –	  The	  Emotional	  Asymmetry	  
1.	  Future-­‐Bias	  	   A	  person	  is	  future-­‐biased	  when	  she	  would	  rather,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  that	  bad	  things	  be	  in	  the	  past	  than	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  that	  good	  things	  be	  the	  future	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	   Most	  of	  us	  are,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  degree,	  future-­‐biased.	  Consider:	  	  Your	  Past	  or	  Future	  Pain	  You	  wake	  up	  with	  an	  aching	  jaw.	  What	  is	  going	  on?	  You	  remember	  that	  you	  were	  scheduled	  to	  have	  your	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed,	  painfully	  but	  safely,	  under	  a	  weak	  local	  anesthetic,	  on	  Thursday.	  But	  has	  that	  happened	  yet?	  In	  your	  groggy	  condition	  you	  are	  not	  sure.	  It	  could	  be	  Friday	  morning.	  The	  ache	  in	  your	  jaw	  would	  then	  be	  an	  after-­‐effect	  of	  the	  operation.	  And	  it	  could	  be	  Thursday	  morning.	  The	  ache	  in	  your	  jaw	  would	  then	  be	  the	  distress	  of	  your	  impacted	  teeth.	  	  I	  expect	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  you	  would	  want	  it	  to	  be	  Friday.	  You	  would	  want	  your	  pain	  to	  be	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  	   Indeed,	  for	  most	  of	  us,	  our	  future-­‐bias	  is	  strong	  enough	  that	  sometimes	  we	  would	  rather	  that	  bad	  things	  be	  in	  the	  past	  than	  in	  the	  future	  when	  other	  things	  are	  not	  equal.	  Sometimes	  we	  would	  rather	  that	  worse	  things	  be	  in	  the	  past	  than	  that	  less	  bad	  things	  be	  in	  the	  future.	  Consider:	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  Your	  Greater-­‐Past	  or	  Lesser-­‐Future	  Pain	  Again	  you	  wake	  up	  with	  an	  aching	  jaw.	  What	  is	  going	  on?	  This	  time	  you	  know	  that	  it	  is	  Thursday	  morning,	  but	  you	  cannot	  quite	  remember	  what	  was	  scheduled	  to	  happen	  to	  you.	  Either	  you	  were	  to	  have	  your	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  weaker	  anesthetic	  on	  Wednesday,	  or	  you	  were	  to	  have	  them	  removed	  under	  a	  stronger	  anesthetic	  on	  Thursday.	  	  Not	  to	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  this,	  though.	  Both	  kinds	  of	  operation	  are	  safe,	  and	  their	  after-­‐effects	  are	  exactly	  the	  same.	  	  I	  expect	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  you	  would	  rather	  that	  you	  have	  had	  the	  Wednesday	  operation	  than	  that	  you	  will	  have	  the	  Thursday	  operation.	  You	  would	  rather	  that	  you	  experienced	  more	  pain,	  yesterday,	  than	  that	  you	  will	  experience	  less	  bad	  pain,	  today.	  	  	   I	  will	  address	  two	  questions	  concerning	  future-­‐bias	  here.	  First,	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  sorts	  of	  things	  are	  we	  future-­‐biased?	  Is	  it	  that	  we	  want	  all	  things	  that	  we	  regard	  as	  bad	  to	  be	  in	  the	  past,	  or	  just	  some	  of	  them?	  Second,	  are	  we	  justified	  in	  being	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  things?	  This	  second	  question	  has	  received	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  attention	  from	  philosophers	  (a	  wave	  of	  attention	  followed	  some	  enigmatic	  remarks	  by	  Arthur	  Prior	  (in	  Prior	  1954),	  another	  wave	  followed	  an	  extended	  treatment	  of	  the	  topic	  by	  Derek	  Parfit	  (in	  Chapter	  8	  of	  Parfit	  1984)).	  My	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  survey	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  question,	  and	  to	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  things	  presently	  lie.	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2.	  With	  Respect	  to	  What	  Sort	  of	  Things	  are	  We	  Future-­‐Biased?	  	   This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  psychologists	  are	  best-­‐placed	  to	  answer.	  But,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  psychologists	  have	  paid	  relativelyi	  little	  direct	  attention	  to	  it,ii	  so	  let’s	  make	  	  do	  with	  armchair	  resources	  here.	  I	  am	  not	  a	  psychologist,	  but	  I	  possess	  a	  moderately	  normal	  psychology,	  and	  I	  can	  say	  things	  based	  on	  informal	  observation	  of	  it.	  	  	   First,	  I	  am	  future-­‐biased,	  not	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  my	  pain,	  but	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  experiences	  of	  mine	  that	  I	  take	  to	  be	  bad,	  experiences	  that	  are	  not	  so	  naturally	  described	  as	  ‘pain’.	  Consider:	  	  My	  Past	  or	  Future	  Awkwardness	  I	  wake	  up	  wincing.	  What	  is	  going	  on?	  I	  remember	  that	  I	  was	  scheduled	  to	  have	  an	  awkward	  meeting	  with	  a	  colleague	  on	  Thursday	  –	  a	  meeting	  sure	  to	  elicit	  disappointment,	  anger	  and	  embarrassment	  in	  us	  both.	  But	  has	  that	  happened	  yet?	  In	  my	  groggy	  condition	  I	  am	  not	  sure.	  It	  could	  be	  Friday	  morning.	  It	  could	  be	  Thursday	  morning.	  	  I	  guess	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  I	  would	  want	  my	  awkwardness	  to	  be	  in	  the	  past.	  Indeed	  the	  desire	  would	  be	  as	  acute,	  as	  pressing,	  as	  my	  desire	  that	  dental	  pain	  be	  in	  the	  past	  in	  Past	  or	  Future	  Pain.	  	  	   Second,	  I	  am	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  things	  that	  I	  take	  to	  be	  bad	  for	  me	  when	  the	  badness-­‐for-­‐me	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  my	  having	  bad	  experiences.	  Consider:	  	  Past	  or	  Future	  Infidelity	  I	  learn	  that	  my	  wife	  plans	  to	  be	  unfaithful	  to	  me,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  this	  week.	  I	  very	  much	  do	  not	  want	  this	  to	  happen.	  But,	  being	  a	  non-­‐
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confrontational	  sort	  of	  a	  fellow,	  I	  decide	  not	  to	  try	  to	  prevent	  it	  from	  happening.	  I	  isolate	  myself	  from	  her	  –	  I	  retreat	  to	  Yorkshire	  and	  work	  on	  some	  philosophy.	  Time	  passes.	  Has	  the	  dread	  event	  occurred?	  I	  don’t	  know.	  	  I	  guess	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  I	  would	  not	  in	  any	  way	  care	  about	  whether	  her	  infidelity	  was	  in	  the	  immediate	  past	  or	  the	  immediate	  future.	  	   Third,	  I	  am	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  things	  that	  I	  take	  to	  be	  bad,	  though	  not	  particularly	  bad	  for	  me,	  when	  the	  badness	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  anybody’s	  having	  bad	  experiences.	  Consider:	  	  The	  Jets’	  Past	  or	  Future	  Victory	  I	  very	  much	  do	  not	  want	  the	  New	  York	  Jets	  to	  win	  today’s	  Superbowl.	  I	  regard	  their	  success	  as	  a	  very	  bad	  thing.	  But	  they	  are	  heavy	  favorites.	  I	  isolate	  myself	  from	  the	  game	  –	  plug	  my	  ears,	  unplug	  my	  television,	  and	  work	  on	  some	  philosophy.	  Time	  passes.	  Has	  the	  dread	  event	  occurred?	  I	  don’t	  know.	  	  I	  guess	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  I	  would	  not	  in	  any	  way	  care	  about	  whether	  the	  Jets’	  victory	  was	  in	  the	  immediate	  past	  or	  immediate	  future.	  	   Fourth,	  and	  last,	  my	  attitude	  towards	  other	  people’s	  bad	  experiences	  is	  curiously	  dis-­‐uniform.	  	  Sometimes	  I	  am	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  people’s	  bad	  experiences.	  Consider:	  	  My	  Nearby	  Daughter’s	  Greater-­‐Past	  or	  Lesser-­‐Future	  Pain	  I	  learn	  that	  my	  daughter,	  away	  at	  college,	  was	  scheduled	  either	  to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  weaker	  anesthetic	  on	  Wednesday,	  or	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to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  stronger	  anesthetic	  on	  Thursday	  (not	  to	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  this,	  though	  –	  	  both	  operations	  are	  safe	  and	  their	  after-­‐effects	  are	  exactly	  the	  same).	  I	  drive	  over	  to	  see	  her	  on	  Thursday	  morning.	  I	  find	  her	  restlessly	  sleeping.	  Has	  she	  had	  the	  operation	  yet?	  I	  don’t	  know.	  	  I	  guess	  that,	  in	  this	  situation,	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  my	  daughter	  have	  had	  the	  operation	  on	  Wednesday.	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  she	  experienced	  worse	  pain,	  yesterday,	  than	  that	  she	  will	  experience	  less	  bad	  pain,	  today.	  	   But	  sometimes	  I	  am	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  people’s	  bad	  experiences.	  Consider:	  	  My	  Distant	  Daughter’s	  Greater-­‐Past	  or	  Lesser-­‐Future	  Pain	  I	  learn,	  by	  letter,	  that	  my	  daughter,	  away	  at	  a	  distant,	  monastic	  retreat,	  far	  from	  phones	  or	  email,	  was	  scheduled	  either	  to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  weaker	  local	  anesthetic	  on	  Wednesday,	  or	  to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  stronger	  local	  anesthetic	  on	  Thursday.	  In	  either	  case,	  I	  will	  have	  no	  contact	  with	  her	  for	  another	  two	  months.	  It	  is	  Thursday	  morning.	  Has	  she	  had	  the	  operation	  yet?	  I	  don’t	  know.	  	  I	  guess	  that	  in	  this	  situation	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  my	  daughter	  have	  the	  operation	  on	  Thursday.	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  she	  will	  experience	  less	  bad	  pain,	  today,	  than	  that	  she	  have	  experienced	  worse	  pain,	  yesterday.	  	   What	  cues	  me	  to	  take	  different	  attitudes	  in	  the	  two	  cases?	  Why	  do	  I	  care,	  in	  the	  former	  case,	  about	  how	  much	  pain	  she	  will	  experience	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  about	  how	  much	  pain	  she	  will	  have	  experienced	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	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life?	  Distance	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  she	  is	  near,	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  far.	  The	  psychological	  salience	  of	  her	  present	  condition	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  I	  am	  vividly	  aware	  of	  her	  as	  she	  is	  now,	  but	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  I	  am	  not.	  Communication	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  I	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  communicate	  with	  her	  soon,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  I	  know	  that	  she	  (being	  future-­‐biased	  on	  her	  own	  behalf)	  will	  wish	  that	  she	  had	  the	  more	  painful,	  Wednesday	  operation,	  but	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  I	  will	  not	  be	  in	  position	  to	  communicate	  with	  her	  until	  much	  later,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  I	  know	  we	  will	  both	  wish	  that	  she	  had	  the	  less	  painful,	  Thursday	  operation.	  	   These	  seem	  to	  me	  to	  be	  the	  factors	  that	  trigger	  future-­‐bias	  on	  behalf	  of	  my	  daughter.	  Whether	  they	  should	  trigger	  future-­‐bias	  on	  behalf	  of	  my	  daughter	  is	  another	  matter.	  I	  will	  address	  it	  in	  section	  5.	  	   To	  summarize	  this	  section:	  I	  am	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  my	  own	  bad	  experiences.	  I	  am	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  things	  that	  I	  take	  to	  be	  bad	  (whether	  bad	  for	  me,	  like	  my	  wife’s	  infidelity,	  or	  bad	  in	  some	  other	  way,	  like	  the	  Jets’	  victory)	  where	  the	  badness	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  bad	  experiences.	  I	  am	  selectively	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  other	  people’s	  bad	  experiences.	  And	  I	  believe	  I	  am	  not	  abnormal	  in	  these	  respects.	  Other	  people	  tell	  me	  they	  feel	  the	  same	  way.	  	  
3.	  Some	  Poor	  Arguments	  for	  Future-­‐Bias	  	   Future-­‐bias	  is	  deeply	  engrained	  in	  us.	  It	  is	  there	  before	  we	  study	  physics	  or	  philosophy,	  before	  we	  have	  any	  educated	  views	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  time,	  about	  what	  it	  is	  for	  an	  event	  to	  be	  past	  or	  future.	  But	  physicists	  and	  philosophers	  have	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thought	  hard	  and	  learned	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  time.	  In	  light	  of	  what	  they	  have	  learned,	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased	  in	  the	  way	  we	  are	  future-­‐biased?	  	   An	  analogous	  question	  (as	  a	  warm-­‐up):	  	  We	  tend	  to	  be	  mammal-­‐biased.	  We	  tend	  to	  care,	  for	  example,	  more	  about	  the	  pain	  of	  ferrets	  than	  about	  the	  pain	  of	  mackerel.	  That	  pattern	  of	  concern	  is	  there	  before	  we	  have	  any	  educated	  views	  about	  animal	  physiology.	  But	  scientists	  have	  learned	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  animal	  physiology.	  In	  light	  what	  they	  have	  learned,	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  be	  mammal-­‐biased?	  	   There	  are	  three	  basic	  positions	  to	  take.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased,	  that	  we	  would	  be	  making	  some	  kind	  of	  mistake	  in	  failing	  to	  be	  so.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased,	  that	  we	  are	  making	  some	  kind	  of	  mistake	  by	  being	  so.	  And	  we	  could	  say	  that	  it	  is	  fine	  either	  way.	  	  	   Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  first	  position.	  We	  ought	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  Why?	  When	  I	  ask	  people	  this	  question,	  I	  find	  that	  some,	  very	  carefully,	  answer:	  	  	   “Past	  pains	  should	  matter	  less	  to	  us	  because	  they	  are	  past,	  future	  pains	  should	  matter	  more	  to	  us	  because	  they	  are	  future.	  At	  some	  point	  explanations	  and	  justifications	  must	  stop.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  those	  points.”	  	   And	  many	  more	  answer,	  less	  carefully,	  in	  what	  amounts	  to	  the	  same	  way.	  They	  say	  things	  like:	  	   “Because	  past	  pains	  have	  happened,	  future	  pains	  are	  yet	  to	  happen.”	  	   “Because	  past	  pains	  are	  gone	  forever,	  future	  pains	  are	  still	  to	  come.”	  	   “Because	  the	  past	  is	  behind	  us,	  the	  future	  ahead	  of	  us.”	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But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  they	  achieve,	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  past	  pains	  ‘have	  happened’,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  ‘gone	  forever’,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  ‘behind	  us’,	  beyond	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  past	  pains	  are	  past.	  	   Maybe	  this	  sort	  of	  answer	  is	  right.	  But	  we	  should	  not	  settle	  for	  it	  without	  first	  considering	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  good,	  persuasive	  argument	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased	  –	  an	  argument	  whose	  premises	  will	  be	  accepted	  be	  people	  who	  are	  not	  antecedently	  committed	  to	  the	  conclusion.	  	  	   One	  thing	  such	  an	  argument	  could	  do	  is	  point	  to	  some	  difference	  between	  past	  and	  future	  pains,	  beyond	  that	  the	  ones	  are	  past	  and	  the	  others	  future,	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  care	  more	  about	  the	  future	  pains.	  	   What	  sort	  of	  differences	  could	  play	  this	  role?	  A	  candidate	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  existence.	  Suppose	  the	  shrinking	  block	  theory	  of	  time	  is	  correct	  –	  future	  events	  exist,	  past	  events	  do	  not.	  Then	  perhaps	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  future	  pains	  than	  past	  ones,	  because	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  what	  is	  than	  about	  what	  is	  not.	  	  	   But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  very	  satisfactory	  argument.	  First,	  note	  that	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  shrinking	  block	  theory	  of	  time	  we	  must	  use	  the	  term	  ‘exist’	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  not	  an	  analytic	  truth	  that	  all	  things	  that	  exist	  exist-­‐in-­‐the-­‐present-­‐moment.	  But	  once	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  using	  the	  term	  this	  way	  (to	  mark	  that	  they	  are	  using	  the	  term	  this	  way,	  philosophers	  often	  speak	  of	  ‘tenseless	  existence’	  –	  I	  will	  follow	  suit	  here)	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  so	  obvious	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  what	  tenselessly	  exists	  than	  about	  what	  does	  not	  tenselessly	  exist.	  Furthermore	  the	  shrinking	  block	  theory	  of	  time	  has	  it	  that	  my	  past	  pains	  tenselessly	  existed	  –	  the	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block	  was	  larger	  than	  it	  now.	  And	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  so	  obvious	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  what	  tenselessly	  exists	  than	  about	  what	  tenselessly	  existed.	  	  Second,	  if	  the	  shrinking	  block	  theory	  did	  vindicate	  future-­‐bias	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  own	  bad	  experiences	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  vindicate	  future-­‐bias	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  bad	  things.	  But	  we	  are	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  bad	  things	  (think	  of	  my	  wife’s	  infidelity,	  my	  distant	  daughter’s	  pain,	  the	  Jets’	  victory).	  So	  it	  will	  not	  vindicate	  our	  entire	  package	  of	  future-­‐biased	  attitudes.	  Third,	  I	  know	  of	  no	  independent	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  shrinking	  block	  theory	  of	  time	  –	  nothing	  that	  would	  move	  a	  future-­‐unbiased	  person	  to	  accept	  it.iii	  	   Another	  candidate	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  metaphysical	  openness.	  	  Maybe	  the	  future	  is	  metaphysically	  open,	  the	  past	  not.	  One	  way	  (of	  several)	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  this	  idea:	  Say	  that	  an	  event	  is	  presently	  settled	  when	  either	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  event	  is	  occurring	  or	  will	  occur	  or	  has	  occurred,	  or	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  event	  is	  not	  occurring	  and	  will	  not	  occur	  and	  has	  not	  occurred.	  Maybe	  the	  norm	  is	  for	  past	  events	  to	  be	  presently	  settled	  but	  future	  events	  not.	  So	  Nelson’s	  victory	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Trafalgar	  is	  presently	  settled,	  but	  Obama’s	  victory	  in	  the	  election	  of	  2012	  is	  not	  –	  it	  is	  neither	  the	  case	  that	  it	  will	  occur	  nor	  the	  case	  that	  it	  will	  not	  occur.	  Then	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  future	  events	  than	  past	  ones,	  because	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  care	  more	  about	  what	  is	  presently	  unsettled	  than	  what	  is	  presently	  settled.	  	   But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  very	  satisfactory	  argument	  either.	  Perhaps	  it	  does	  make	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  direct	  our	  attention	  towards	  presently	  unsettled	  events,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  prefer	  that	  episodes	  of	  pain	  be	  presently	  
	   10	  
settled	  rather	  than	  presently	  unsettled.	  The	  opposite	  seems	  true.	  Why	  not	  prefer	  that	  the	  bad	  event	  be	  presently	  unsettled?	  	   Yet	  another	  candidate	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  epistemic	  openness.	  We	  have	  very	  different	  epistemic	  access	  to	  the	  past	  and	  future.	  We	  learn	  about	  the	  past	  through	  memory,	  through	  record,	  through	  reconstruction.	  We	  learn	  about	  the	  future	  through	  anticipation,	  through	  prediction.	  The	  latter	  modes	  of	  access	  are	  less	  robust	  than	  the	  former.	  We	  tend	  to	  know	  more	  about	  the	  past	  than	  the	  future.	  Could	  this	  somehow	  vindicate	  future-­‐bias?	  It	  does	  not	  look	  promising.	  Why	  would	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  want	  pain	  to	  be	  such	  that	  I	  am	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  know	  of	  it?	  	   Yet	  another	  candidate	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  causation.	  We	  often	  cause	  future	  events	  to	  occur,	  but	  rarely,	  outside	  of	  science	  fiction,	  cause	  past	  events	  to	  occur.	  Could	  this	  somehow	  vindicate	  future-­‐bias?	  Again,	  it	  does	  not	  look	  promising.	  Why	  would	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  prefer	  that	  I	  have	  no	  control	  over	  whether	  a	  pain	  event	  occurs	  than	  that	  I	  have	  control	  over	  whether	  a	  pain	  event	  occurs?	  And,	  in	  any	  case,	  we	  very	  often	  do	  not	  have	  control	  over	  future	  events.	  We	  can	  readily	  tweak	  the	  Past	  or	  Future	  Pain	  examples	  so	  that,	  no	  matter	  whether	  the	  pain-­‐event	  is	  past	  or	  future,	  I	  have	  no	  control	  over	  whether	  it	  occurs.	  	  	  	  	   But	  perhaps	  there	  is	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  argument	  that	  turns	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  control	  aspects	  of	  the	  future.	  Here’s	  a	  simple	  evolutionary	  story	  (for	  more	  sophisticated	  stories	  see	  Maclaurin	  and	  Dyke	  2002	  and	  Suhler	  and	  Callender	  forthcoming):	  It	  is	  not	  an	  accident	  that	  we	  are	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  pain.	  That	  feature	  of	  ourselves	  has	  been	  selected-­‐for	  by	  evolution.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  causation,	  ancestral	  creatures	  that	  focused	  their	  practical	  attention	  on	  the	  future	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did	  better	  than	  their	  peers	  that	  focused	  their	  attention	  on	  the	  past.	  And	  a	  cognitively	  efficient	  way	  to	  focus	  a	  creature’s	  practical	  attention	  on	  the	  future	  is	  to	  have	  the	  creature	  care	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  its	  future	  pains	  and	  not	  at	  all	  about	  its	  past	  pains	  –	  a	  pattern	  of	  concern	  that	  quite	  naturally	  yields	  a	  preference	  for	  pain	  being	  past	  rather	  than	  future.	  	   Maybe	  the	  same	  feature	  that	  served	  our	  swampy	  ancestors	  well	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  pass	  on	  DNA	  serves	  us	  well	  in	  our	  quest	  to	  have	  good	  lives.	  We	  are	  better	  off	  for	  caring	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  our	  future	  pains	  and	  not	  at	  all	  about	  our	  past	  pains.	  	   This	  argument,	  if	  it	  worked,	  would	  give	  us	  what	  is	  known	  as	  a	  state-­‐based	  justification	  for	  future-­‐bias.	  It	  does	  not	  address	  the	  desirability	  of	  our	  pain	  being	  past	  rather	  than	  future.	  It	  does	  not	  point	  out	  a	  difference	  between	  past	  and	  future	  pains,	  in	  light	  of	  which	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  prefer	  that	  pain	  be	  past.	  It	  addresses	  the	  desirability	  of	  our	  preferring	  that	  pain	  be	  past.	  It	  points	  out	  a	  difference	  between	  preferring	  that	  pain	  be	  past	  and	  failing	  to	  do	  so,	  in	  light	  of	  which	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  desire	  that	  we	  prefer	  that	  pain	  be	  past.	  State-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  mental	  attitudes	  have	  notoriously	  limited	  persuasive	  force	  (because	  the	  move	  from	  your	  taking	  something	  to	  be	  desirable	  to	  your	  desiring	  it	  is	  seamless,	  while	  the	  move	  from	  your	  taking	  it	  to	  be	  desirable	  that	  you	  desire	  something	  to	  your	  desiring	  it	  is	  much	  less	  so.)	  But	  still,	  perhaps	  we	  would	  have	  made	  some	  progress	  towards	  justifying	  future-­‐bias.	  	   But	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  work.	  Whatever	  the	  capabilities	  of	  my	  swampy	  ancestors,	  I	  think	  that	  I	  am	  well	  capable	  of	  focusing	  my	  practical	  attention	  on	  future	  things	  over	  which	  I	  have	  control	  without	  being	  future-­‐biased.	  And	  any	  loss	  of	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cognitive	  efficiency	  that	  would	  accompany	  this	  has	  to	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  benefits	  that	  would	  accompany	  it.	  As	  Parfit	  himself	  pointed	  out	  (in	  Chapter	  8	  of	  Parfit	  1984),	  when	  you	  are	  old	  and	  your	  future	  is	  short	  and	  dusky	  it	  may	  well	  be	  in	  your	  interest	  to	  be	  future-­‐unbiased.	  	   That	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  contingent	  feature	  of	  me	  and	  my	  circumstances.	  Maybe	  for	  some	  people,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  beneficial	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  But	  the	  same	  holds	  for	  all	  practical	  attitudes.	  	   Will	  any	  other	  argument	  work?	  I	  know	  of	  no	  good,	  persuasive	  argument	  for	  future-­‐bias.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  come	  across	  future-­‐unbiased,	  but	  otherwise	  rational	  alien,	  then	  I	  will	  not	  suppose	  myself	  able	  to	  convert	  her	  by	  force	  of	  reasoning.	  More	  personally:	  if	  you	  lose	  your	  future-­‐bias	  then	  reasoning	  will	  not	  recover	  it	  for	  you.	  Not	  to	  worry,	  though,	  because	  you	  won’t	  lose	  it	  –	  you	  may	  as	  well	  try	  to	  lose	  your	  skin.	  	  
4.	  The	  Arbitrariness	  Argument	  Against	  Future-­‐Bias	  	   The	  opposite	  position	  is	  that	  we	  are	  we	  making	  a	  mistake	  in	  being	  future-­‐biased?	  We	  should	  be	  future-­‐unbiased.	  Why?	  One	  reply:	  	   “It	  just	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  a	  pain	  is	  past	  or	  future.	  We	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  care	  about	  that.	  So	  future-­‐bias	  is	  objectionably	  arbitrary	  –	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  caring	  about	  things	  that	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  care	  about.”	  	   Again,	  this	  may	  be	  right.	  But	  again,	  it	  does	  not	  give	  us	  a	  good,	  persuasive	  argument	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  should	  not	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  Only	  the	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antecedently	  persuaded	  will	  accept	  its	  major	  premise	  –	  that	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  care	  about	  whether	  pain	  is	  past	  or	  future.	  	  	   One	  way	  to	  get	  such	  an	  argument	  would	  be	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  pain	  to	  be	  past	  or	  future	  that	  would	  incline	  the	  antecedently	  unpersuaded	  to	  say	  	   “If	  that	  is	  what	  it	  is	  for	  pains	  to	  be	  past	  and	  future,	  well,	  clearly	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  care	  to	  care	  about	  that.”	  	   There	  are	  hints	  of	  such	  an	  argument	  in	  A.N.	  Prior’s	  1954	  article	  “Thank	  Goodness	  That’s	  Over”.	  Prior	  criticized	  philosophers	  (notably	  Quine)	  who	  were	  engaged	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  project	  of	  giving	  a	  semantics	  for	  tensed	  utterances	  (like	  ‘it	  is	  now	  raining’,	  ‘it	  was	  sunny	  yesterday’,	  ‘it	  will	  be	  sunny	  tomorrow’)	  using	  a	  tenseless	  metalanguage	  (a	  metalanguage	  containing	  only	  expressions	  like	  ‘rain	  on	  Monday	  precedes	  sun	  on	  Tuesday’).	  Prior	  wrote:	  	  One	  says,	  e.g.	  ‘Thank	  goodness	  that’s	  over!’,	  and	  not	  only	  is	  this,	  when	  said,	  quite	  clear	  without	  any	  date	  appended,	  but	  it	  says	  something	  which	  it	  is	  impossible	  that	  any	  use	  of	  a	  tenseless	  copula	  with	  a	  date	  should	  convey.	  It	  certainly	  doesn’t	  mean	  the	  same	  as,	  e.g.	  ‘Thank	  goodness	  the	  date	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  that	  thing	  is	  Friday	  June	  15	  1954’,	  even	  if	  it	  be	  said	  then.	  (Nor,	  for	  that	  matter,	  does	  it	  mean	  ‘Thank	  goodness	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  thing	  is	  contemporaneous	  with	  this	  utterance’.	  Why	  should	  anyone	  thank	  goodness	  for	  that?)	  	  	   This	  passage	  is	  famous,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  the	  project	  of	  giving	  a	  tenseless	  semantics	  for	  tensed	  utterances	  has	  endured,	  motivated	  by	  metaphysical	  considerations.	  The	  world	  is	  a	  four-­‐dimensionally	  extended	  space-­‐time	  manifold.	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Things	  within	  the	  world	  may	  have	  relational	  tensed	  properties,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  further,	  non-­‐relational	  tensed	  properties.	  So	  the	  events	  of	  2002	  have	  the	  relational	  tensed	  properties	  of	  being	  future	  relative	  to	  the	  events	  of	  1992	  and	  being	  past	  relative	  
to	  the	  events	  2012,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  further,	  non-­‐relational	  tensed	  property	  of	  being	  past.	  Since	  relational	  tensed	  properties	  can	  be	  described	  in	  tenseless	  language	  (e.g.	  ‘the	  events	  of	  2002	  precede	  the	  events	  of	  2012’),	  we	  can	  describe	  all	  properties	  of	  things	  in	  tenseless	  language.	  So,	  insofar	  as	  tensed	  utterances	  are	  made	  true	  by	  things	  having	  properties,	  we	  can	  describe	  what	  makes	  them	  true	  in	  tenseless	  language.	  	  	   Many	  philosophers	  have	  understood	  Prior	  to	  be	  posing	  a	  kind	  of	  challenge	  to	  the	  four-­‐dimensionalist:	  What	  is	  that	  Prior	  is	  thanking	  goodness	  for,	  when	  he	  thanks	  goodness	  that	  his	  troubles	  are	  over?	  In	  general,	  what	  is	  your	  account	  of	  the	  content	  of	  tensed	  propositional	  attitudes?	  This	  challenge	  has	  been	  answered	  in	  different	  ways.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  answer,	  due	  to	  David	  Lewis	  (1979),	  has	  it	  that	  wanting	  pain	  to	  be	  over	  involves	  wanting	  of	  myself	  (construed	  as	  a	  person-­‐stage	  –	  a	  thing	  that	  does	  not	  persist	  over	  time)	  that	  I	  be	  to-­‐the-­‐future	  of	  pain.	  	   But	  there	  is	  a	  different	  way	  of	  understanding	  Prior.	  If	  the	  four-­‐dimensionalist	  metaphysics	  and	  semantics	  is	  correct	  then	  his	  attitude	  of	  thanking	  goodness	  that	  his	  troubles	  are	  over	  does	  not	  make	  sense.	  Why	  should	  I	  want	  my	  pains	  to	  be	  in	  the	  past	  if	  wanting	  pain	  to	  be	  in	  the	  past	  just	  amounts	  to	  wanting	  of	  myself	  (construed	  as	  a	  person-­‐stage)	  that	  I	  be	  to	  the	  future	  of	  pain?	  	  Wouldn’t	  that	  be	  just	  like	  my	  standing	  in	  a	  row	  of	  soldiers	  at	  a	  parade	  ground,	  knowing	  that	  one	  of	  them	  has	  a	  toothache,	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and	  wanting	  of	  myself	  that	  I	  be	  to	  the	  south	  of	  the	  pain?	  And	  wouldn’t	  such	  a	  desire	  be	  objectionably	  arbitrary?	  	   Now	  it	  must	  be	  said	  that,	  though	  the	  universe	  may	  be	  a	  four-­‐dimensionally	  extended	  manifold,	  the	  temporal	  dimension	  is	  not	  just	  like	  the	  spatial	  dimensions.	  There	  are	  interesting	  asymmetries	  along	  the	  temporal	  dimension	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  along	  the	  spatial	  dimensions	  –	  epistemic	  asymmetries,	  causal	  asymmetries,	  entropic	  asymmetries.	  But,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  any	  of	  these	  things	  give	  me	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  So,	  by	  pointing	  to	  these	  things,	  we	  do	  not	  explain	  why	  a	  desire	  that	  I	  (construed	  as	  a	  person-­‐stage)	  be	  to	  the-­‐future-­‐of	  pain	  is	  less	  arbitrary	  than	  a	  desire	  that	  I	  be	  to	  the	  south	  of	  pain.	  	  	  	   It	  also	  must	  be	  said	  that,	  even	  if	  four-­‐dimensionalism	  is	  false,	  a	  charge	  of	  arbitrariness	  can	  be	  leveled	  at	  future-­‐bias.	  One	  way	  for	  four-­‐dimensionalism	  to	  be	  false	  is	  for	  presentism	  to	  be	  true.	  My	  past	  and	  future	  pains	  do	  not	  tenselessly	  exist.	  Tensed	  locutions	  like	  ‘it	  was	  that’	  and	  ‘it	  will	  be	  that’	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  sentential	  operators	  for	  which	  no	  reductive	  semantics	  can	  be	  given.	  My	  wanting	  my	  pain	  to	  be	  past	  involves	  my	  preferring	  that	  it	  was	  that	  (I	  am	  in	  pain)	  rather	  than	  that	  
it	  will	  be	  that	  (I	  am	  in	  pain).	  But	  why	  care	  about	  that?	  Another	  way	  for	  four-­‐dimensionalism	  to	  be	  false	  is	  for	  tense	  realism	  to	  be	  true.	  My	  past	  and	  future	  pains	  tenselessly	  exist,	  but	  their	  being	  past	  or	  future	  consists	  in	  their	  having	  non-­‐relational	  tensed	  properties.	  My	  wanting	  my	  pain	  to	  be	  past	  involves	  my	  preferring	  that	  it	  have	  the	  non-­‐relational	  property	  being	  past,	  rather	  than	  the	  non-­‐relational	  property	  being	  future.	  But	  why	  care	  about	  that?	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   Prior’s	  implicit	  idea	  (the	  way	  we	  are	  reading	  him	  here)	  is	  that	  we	  face	  a	  special	  burden	  of	  explanation	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  attributing	  significance	  to	  the	  way	  things	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  ourselves.	  It	  is	  entirely	  familiar	  and	  unproblematic	  that	  we	  take	  it	  to	  matter	  whether	  pain	  has	  certain	  intrinsic	  features,	  but	  can	  give	  no	  persuasive	  argument	  as	  to	  why.	  I	  think	  it	  matters	  whether	  pain	  is	  less	  intense	  or	  more	  intense.	  	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  I	  could	  persuade	  an	  intensity-­‐unbiased	  but	  otherwise	  rational	  alien	  of	  this.	  But	  this	  does	  not,	  and	  should	  not,	  bother	  me.	  It	  is	  also	  entirely	  familiar	  and	  unproblematic	  that	  we	  take	  it	  to	  matter	  whether	  certain	  sentences	  containing	  sentential	  operators	  for	  which	  no	  reductive	  semantics	  can	  be	  given	  are	  true,	  but	  can	  give	  no	  persuasive	  argument	  as	  to	  why.	  I	  think	  it	  matters	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (I	  am	  in	  pain)	  or	  it	  might	  have	  been,	  but	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  (I	  am	  in	  pain).	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  I	  could	  persuade	  an	  actuality-­‐unbiased	  but	  otherwise	  rational	  alien	  of	  this.	  But	  this	  does	  not,	  and	  should	  not,	  bother	  me.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  okay	  to	  take	  it	  to	  matter	  whether	  I	  stand	  in	  a	  certain	  relation	  to	  pain,	  but	  be	  unable	  to	  give	  a	  persuasive	  argument	  as	  to	  why.iv	  	   I	  am	  quite	  taken	  by	  this	  idea	  (see	  Hare	  2009).	  But	  for	  present	  purposes	  that	  does	  not	  matter.	  What	  matters	  is	  that	  there	  is	  some	  distance	  between	  accepting	  the	  idea	  and	  rejecting	  future-­‐bias.	  Prior	  took	  himself	  to	  be	  arguing	  against	  four-­‐dimensionalism,	  not	  future-­‐bias.	  The	  idea	  tells	  against	  future-­‐bias	  only	  if	  we	  have	  a	  strong	  antecedent	  commitment	  to	  four-­‐dimensionalism.	  If	  we	  have	  no	  such	  commitment	  then	  we	  can	  remain	  untroubled.	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5.	  Incoherence	  Arguments	  Against	  Future-­‐Bias	  	   Some	  patterns	  of	  future-­‐biased	  attitudes	  may	  exhibit	  a	  kind	  of	  structural	  incoherence.	  Look	  back	  at	  my	  attitudes	  towards	  my	  daughter’s	  pain.	  I	  said	  that	  under	  some	  conditions	  (when	  her	  present	  condition	  is	  salient	  to	  me,	  when	  she	  is	  right	  there	  before	  me)	  I	  am	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  her	  pain,	  but	  under	  other	  conditions	  (when	  her	  present	  condition	  is	  not	  salient	  to	  me,	  when	  she	  is	  far	  away,	  when	  I	  know	  that	  I	  will	  not	  interact	  with	  her	  for	  a	  long	  time)	  I	  am	  not	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  her	  pain.	  But,	  whether	  she	  is	  near	  or	  far,	  I	  will	  always	  prefer,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  that	  she	  experience	  less	  pain	  in	  the	  future	  and	  less	  pain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life	  than	  more	  pain	  in	  the	  future	  and	  more	  pain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life.	  	  Now	  consider	  (I	  am	  here	  repeating	  an	  argument	  from	  Hare	  2008):	  	   	  My	  Nearby	  or	  Distant	  Daughter’s	  Greater-­‐Past	  or	  Lesser-­‐Future	  Pain	  Once	  again	  I	  learn,	  by	  letter,	  that	  my	  daughter,	  away	  at	  a	  distant,	  monastic	  retreat,	  far	  from	  phones	  or	  email,	  was	  scheduled	  either	  to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  weaker	  local	  anesthetic	  on	  Wednesday,	  or	  to	  have	  her	  wisdom	  teeth	  removed	  under	  a	  stronger	  local	  anesthetic	  on	  Thursday.	  But	  this	  time	  I	  am	  unsure	  where	  the	  letter	  came	  from.	  She	  is	  either	  staying	  in	  a	  monastery	  in	  the	  far-­‐north	  of	  Japan	  or	  staying	  in	  a	  monastery	  in	  the	  far-­‐south	  of	  Japan.	  Undeterred,	  my	  wife	  and	  I	  jump	  on	  planes	  –	  hers	  heading	  to	  the	  south,	  mine	  heading	  to	  the	  north.	  On	  early	  Thursday	  morning	  I	  arrive	  at	  the	  northern	  monastery	  and	  	  am	  confronted	  with	  a	  sleeping	  figure.	  In	  the	  dim	  light	  I	  cannot	  quite	  tell	  if	  it	  is	  my	  daughter,	  and	  certainly	  cannot	  tell	  if	  my	  daughter	  has	  had	  her	  operation	  yet.	  One	  thing	  I	  do	  know	  is	  this:	  I	  am	  significantly	  better	  than	  my	  wife	  at	  allaying	  pre-­‐operative	  anxieties	  (with	  games,	  funny	  
	   18	  
stories…etc.)	  and	  my	  wife	  is	  significantly	  better	  than	  me	  at	  providing	  post-­‐operative	  comfort	  (with	  hugs,	  grapes…	  etc.).	  	  How	  might	  things	  be?	  She	  might	  be	  near	  or	  far.	  She	  might	  have	  had	  the	  operation	  or	  be	  about	  to	  have	  the	  operation.	  How	  do	  I	  want	  things	  to	  be?	  Well,	  of	  the	  four	  possibilities:	  	  (A)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (B)	  	   She	  is	  near,	  and	  she	  has	  had	   	   	   	   She	  is	  far,	  and	  she	  has	  had	  	  	  	   the	  more	  painful	  operation	   	   	   	   the	  more	  painful	  operation	  	  	  	  	  (C)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (D)	  	   She	  is	  near	  and	  she	  will	  have	   	   	   	   She	  is	  far,	  and	  she	  will	  have	   the	  less	  painful	  operation	   	   	   	   the	  less	  painful	  operation	  	  	  I	  prefer	  (B)	  to	  (A)	  –	  because,	  if	  she	  has	  had	  the	  more	  painful	  operation	  then	  she	  will	  have	  a	  better	  future,	  and	  no	  better	  or	  worse	  a	  past,	  if	  she	  is	  far	  away,	  with	  my	  wife.	  I	  prefer	  (C)	  to	  (D)	  –	  because,	  if	  she	  is	  will	  have	  the	  less	  painful	  operation	  then	  she	  will	  have	  a	  better	  future	  and	  no	  better	  or	  worse	  a	  past,	  if	  she	  is	  right	  here	  with	  me.	  I	  prefer	  (A)	  to	  (C)	  –	  because,	  if	  she	  is	  near	  then	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  she	  have	  the	  better	  future.	  I	  prefer	  (D)	  to	  (B)	  –	  because,	  if	  she	  is	  far	  then	  I	  would	  rather	  that	  she	  suffer	  less	  pain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life.	  My	  preferences	  are	  cyclical.	  	   On	  the	  assumption	  that	  rational	  people	  do	  not	  have	  cyclical	  preferences,	  this	  shows	  that	  I	  cannot,	  if	  I	  am	  rational,	  be	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  my	  daughter’s	  pain	  when	  she	  is	  near,	  future-­‐unbiased	  with	  respect	  to	  her	  pain	  when	  she	  is	  far,	  and	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always	  prefer	  that	  she	  suffer	  less	  pain	  in	  future	  and	  less	  pain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life,	  rather	  than	  more	  pain	  in	  future	  and	  more	  pain	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life,	  no	  matter	  whether	  she	  is	  near	  or	  far.	  Something	  has	  to	  give.	  	   But,	  of	  course,	  it	  does	  not	  show	  that	  there	  is	  something	  quite	  general	  wrong	  with	  future-­‐bias.	  I	  can	  avoid	  incoherency	  just	  by	  becoming	  less	  selective	  in	  my	  future-­‐bias	  towards	  my	  daughter.	  Tom	  Dougherty	  has	  recently	  (Dougherty	  2011)	  presented	  a	  very	  interesting	  coherence	  argument	  to	  the	  stronger	  conclusion	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  something	  quite	  general	  wrong	  with	  future-­‐bias.	  	   All	  of	  the	  examples	  we	  have	  seen	  so	  far	  involve	  people	  awaiting	  news.	  Future-­‐bias	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  their	  reactions	  to	  the	  news	  (e.g.	  in	  determining	  whether	  they	  are	  relieved	  upon	  hearing	  that	  they	  had	  the	  more	  painful	  operation	  yesterday)	  but	  it	  does	  not	  play	  any	  role	  in	  determining	  how	  they	  act.	  And	  one	  might	  think	  that	  this	  is	  quite	  generally	  true.	  Future-­‐bias	  is	  not	  action-­‐guiding	  in	  realistic	  contexts.	  The	  characteristic	  preferences	  are	  between	  states	  of	  affairs	  with	  different	  past	  components	  (e.g.	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  you	  suffered	  more	  pain	  yesterday	  and	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  you	  suffered	  less	  pain	  yesterday).	  But,	  outside	  of	  science	  fiction,	  we	  are	  never	  in	  a	  position	  to	  bring	  about	  states	  of	  affairs	  with	  different	  past	  components.	  Outside	  of	  science	  fiction,	  we	  cannot	  change	  the	  past.	  	  	  	   Dougherty’s	  first	  observation	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  quite	  right.	  Sometimes	  our	  actions	  may	  be	  guided,	  not	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  change	  the	  past,	  but	  by	  our	  views	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  good	  or	  bad	  that	  the	  past	  be	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  If	  you	  are	  risk	  averse,	  for	  example,	  then	  you	  will	  act	  so	  as	  to	  protect	  yourself	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	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really	  bad	  things	  happening	  or	  having	  happened.	  But	  what	  things	  you	  consider	  
really	  bad	  may	  depend	  on	  whether	  you	  are	  future-­‐biased.	  	  	  	   Dougherty’s	  second	  observation	  is	  that	  sometimes	  a	  future-­‐biased	  and	  risk	  averse	  person	  may	  be	  driven	  to	  act	  to	  her	  own	  acknowledged	  disadvantage.	  He	  imagines	  a	  situation	  of	  this	  general	  kind	  (I	  have	  changed	  some	  details):	  	   Two	  Courses	  of	  Treatment	  At	  all	  times	  you	  know	  all	  this:	  You	  are	  to	  scheduled	  to	  undergo	  one	  of	  two	  courses	  of	  treatment.	  Course	  A	  involves	  a	  painful,	  ten	  minute	  operation	  on	  Tuesday	  and	  another	  painful,	  five	  minute	  operation	  on	  Thursday.	  Course	  B	  involves	  just	  one	  painful,	  ten	  minute	  operation	  on	  Thursday.	  Either	  way,	  on	  Monday	  and	  Wednesday	  you	  will	  have	  no	  idea	  which	  course	  you	  are	  on	  (Wednesday-­‐amnesia	  is	  part	  of	  both	  courses).	  And,	  either	  way,	  on	  Monday	  you	  will	  be	  offered	  a	  deal	  that	  will	  take	  a	  minute	  off	  the	  Thursday	  operation	  if	  you	  are	  on	  Course	  A,	  and	  add	  two	  minutes	  to	  the	  Thursday	  operation	  if	  you	  are	  on	  course	  B.	  And,	  either	  way,	  on	  Wednesday	  you	  will	  be	  offered	  a	  deal	  that	  will	  add	  two	  minutes	  to	  the	  Thursday	  operation	  if	  you	  are	  on	  course	  A,	  and	  take	  a	  minute	  off	  the	  Thursday	  operation	  if	  you	  are	  on	  course	  B.	  	  Your	  decision	  on	  Monday	  will	  have	  no	  causal	  influence	  over	  your	  decision	  on	  Wednesday.	  	  What	  will	  you	  do,	  in	  this	  situation,	  if	  you	  are	  future-­‐biased	  and	  risk	  averse?	  Note	  that	  there	  are	  four	  paths	  for	  you	  to	  go	  down	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  week,	  and	  the	  	  results	  of	  your	  going	  down	  these	  paths	  look	  like	  this:	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  On	  Monday	  	   	   On	  Wednesday	   	   The	  Result	  	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   You	  Accept	   	   Course	  A:	  10	  on	  Tues,	  6	  on	  Thurs	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Course	  B:	  0	  on	  Tues,	  11	  on	  Thurs	  	   	  	  	  	  	  You	  Accept	   	   	   	   	   	   Course	  A:	  10	  on	  Tues,	  4	  on	  Thurs	  	   	   	   	   You	  Decline	   	   Course	  B:	  0	  on	  Tues,	  12	  on	  Thurs	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   You	  Accept	   	   Course	  A:	  10	  on	  Tues,	  7	  on	  Thurs	   	  	   	  	  	  	  You	  Decline	   	   	   	   	   	   Course	  B:	  0	  on	  Tues,	  9	  on	  Thurs	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Course	  A:	  10	  on	  Tues,	  5	  on	  Thurs	  	  	   	   	   	   	   You	  Decline	   	   Course	  B:	  0	  on	  Tues,	  10	  on	  Thurs	  	   	  	  	  On	  Monday,	  being	  risk-­‐averse,	  you	  want	  to	  protect	  yourself	  against	  the	  thing	  you	  now	  consider	  to	  be	  really	  bad	  happening	  –	  your	  being	  on	  Course	  B.	  So	  you	  prefer	  
Accepting-­‐then-­‐Accepting	  to	  Declining-­‐then-­‐Accepting,	  and	  you	  prefer	  Accepting-­‐
then-­‐Declining	  to	  Declining-­‐then-­‐Declining.	  (In	  something	  closer	  to	  English:	  on	  Monday	  you	  would	  rather	  that	  you	  accept	  Monday’s	  deal,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  will	  later	  do.)	  On	  Wednesday,	  being	  risk-­‐averse	  and	  future-­‐biased,	  you	  want	  to	  protect	  yourself	  against	  the	  thing	  you	  now	  consider	  to	  be	  really	  bad	  happening	  –	  your	  being	  on	  Course	  A.	  So	  you	  prefer	  Accepting-­‐then-­‐Accepting	  to	  Accepting-­‐then-­‐
Declining,	  and	  you	  prefer	  Declining-­‐then-­‐Accepting	  to	  Declining-­‐then-­‐Declining.	  (On	  Wednesday	  you	  would	  rather	  that	  you	  accept	  Wednesday’s	  deal,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  did	  earlier).	  But	  throughout	  you	  prefer	  Declining-­‐then-­‐Declining	  to	  Accepting-­‐then-­‐Accepting.	  (Throughout	  you	  would	  rather	  that	  you	  decline	  both	  deals	  than	  accept	  both	  deals).	  	  	   In	  this	  situation,	  if	  you	  act	  on	  your	  preferences	  on	  Monday,	  and	  again	  act	  on	  your	  preferences	  on	  Wednesday,	  then	  you	  will	  be	  working	  to	  your	  own	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acknowledged	  disadvantage	  –	  by	  condemning	  yourself	  to	  an	  extra	  minute	  of	  pain	  on	  Thursday,	  no	  matter	  which	  course	  you	  are	  on.	  	  	   What	  should	  we	  make	  of	  this?	  The	  weak	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  is	  just	  that	  sometimes,	  when	  you	  lack	  the	  power	  to	  self-­‐bind	  (in	  this	  case:	  the	  power	  on	  Monday	  to	  prevent	  your	  later	  self	  from	  accepting	  Wednesday’s	  deal)	  then	  it	  is	  undesirable	  to	  be	  risk-­‐averse	  and	  future-­‐biased.	  This	  is	  no	  great	  news.	  For	  any	  attitude	  you	  might	  have,	  we	  can	  imagine	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  is	  undesirable	  to	  have	  that	  attitude.	  When	  your	  head	  will	  explode	  if	  you	  love	  your	  mother	  it	  is	  undesirable	  for	  you	  to	  love	  your	  mother.	  It	  would	  be	  rash	  to	  conclude	  that	  in	  normal,	  non-­‐explosive	  contexts,	  there	  is	  something	  awry	  with	  you	  loving	  your	  mother.	  	   Dougherty	  tentatively	  pushes	  us	  to	  a	  much	  stronger	  conclusion,	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  is	  a	  rational	  defect	  in	  you	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  The	  difference	  between	  his	  example	  and	  the	  loving-­‐your-­‐mother	  example	  is	  that	  in	  the	  former	  the	  outcome	  that	  is	  undesirable	  by	  your	  own	  lights	  comes	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  your	  own	  free	  choices,	  choices	  that	  you	  endorse	  throughout.	  You	  are	  acting	  in	  a	  disunified	  way.	  But	  rational	  people	  never	  act	  in	  disunified	  ways.	  	   Why	  do	  rational	  people	  never	  act	  in	  disunified	  ways?	  Dougherty	  does	  not	  spell	  out	  the	  answer	  in	  detail.	  His	  basic	  reasoning,	  I	  take	  it,	  is	  this:	  in	  Two	  Courses	  of	  Treatment,	  if	  you	  are	  future-­‐biased	  and	  risk-­‐averse	  then,	  whatever	  you	  do,	  you	  are	  an	  appropriate	  subject	  of	  rational	  criticism.	  If,	  on	  Monday,	  you	  decline	  the	  first	  deal,	  then	  the	  critic	  can	  say	  “Why	  didn’t	  you	  accept	  it?	  On	  Monday	  you	  preferred	  (irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  would	  do	  later)	  that	  you	  accept	  the	  first	  deal.”	  If,	  on	  Wednesday,	  you	  decline	  the	  second	  deal,	  then	  the	  critic	  can	  say	  “Why	  didn’t	  you	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accept	  it?	  On	  Wednesday	  you	  preferred	  (irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  did	  earlier)	  that	  you	  accept	  the	  second	  deal.”	  If	  you	  accept	  both	  deals	  then	  the	  critic	  can	  say	  “Why	  didn’t	  you	  decline	  both	  deals?	  At	  all	  times	  you	  preferred	  that	  you	  decline	  both	  deals	  than	  that	  you	  accept	  both	  deals.”	  But	  rational	  people	  are	  not	  appropriate	  subjects	  of	  rational	  criticism	  so,	  faced	  with	  this	  decision	  problem,	  if	  you	  are	  future-­‐biased	  and	  risk-­‐averse	  then	  you	  are	  irrational.	  But	  rational	  people	  are	  not	  such	  that	  they	  would	  be	  irrational	  if	  faced	  with	  the	  wrong	  decision	  problem.	  So,	  simpliciter,	  if	  you	  are	  future-­‐biased	  and	  risk-­‐averse	  then	  you	  are	  irrational.	  	   Is	  the	  reasoning	  good?	  Here’s	  a	  piece	  of	  circumstantial	  evidence	  against	  it:	  There	  are	  other	  cases	  in	  which	  people,	  by	  acting	  on	  their	  preferences	  (endorsed	  throughout)	  in	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  way,	  work	  to	  their	  own	  acknowledged	  disadvantage	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  future-­‐biased,	  risk-­‐averse	  person	  does	  in	  Two	  Courses	  of	  Treatment,	  and	  in	  some	  of	  these	  cases	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  people	  are	  irrational	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  bad	  preferences.	  	  Consider	  Satan’s	  Apple	  (from	  Arntzenius,	  Elga	  and	  Hawthorne	  2004	  –	  this	  is	  the	  diachronic	  version	  of	  their	  case):	  	  Satan’s	  Apple	  Satan	  cuts	  an	  apple	  into	  infinitely	  many	  slices	  and	  offers	  them	  to	  Eve,	  one	  by	  one,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  an	  hour	  –	  one	  at	  11am,	  another	  at	  11.30,	  another	  at	  11.45…	  etc.	  	  Eve	  will	  make	  infinitely	  many	  decisions,	  knowing	  that	  no	  decision	  she	  makes	  will	  influence	  any	  later	  decision	  she	  makes.	  If,	  at	  noon,	  she	  has	  eaten	  infinitely	  many	  slices	  of	  apple,	  then	  she	  will	  Fall.	  Otherwise	  she	  will	  remain	  in	  Eden.	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Eve	  strongly	  prefers	  Eden	  to	  Earth.	  And,	  all-­‐other-­‐things-­‐being-­‐equal-­‐Eden-­‐and-­‐Earthwise,	  she	  prefers	  to	  eat	  more	  apple	  rather	  than	  less	  apple.	  What	  should	  she	  do?	  	  	   It	  appears	  as	  if,	  whatever	  Eve	  does,	  she	  will	  be	  an	  appropriate	  object	  of	  rational	  criticism.	  If	  she	  fails	  to	  eat	  any	  one	  slice	  then	  the	  critic	  can	  say	  “Why	  didn’t	  you	  eat	  that	  slice?	  You	  preferred	  (irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  would	  later	  do)	  that	  you	  eat	  it,	  and	  you	  knew	  that	  your	  eating	  it	  would	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  whether	  you	  ate	  finitely	  many	  or	  infinitely	  many	  slices.”	  If	  she	  eats	  every	  slice	  then	  the	  critic	  can	  say	  “Why	  did	  you	  eat	  infinitely	  many	  slices?	  You	  preferred	  that	  you	  eat	  finitely	  many	  slices.”	  	   Whatever	  we	  conclude	  from	  this	  example,	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  something	  awry	  with	  Eve’s	  preferences	  –	  that	  we	  would	  all	  be	  rationally	  defective	  in	  preferring	  Eden	  to	  Earth,	  more	  apple	  to	  less	  apple.	  	  	   Where	  exactly	  does	  the	  argument	  to	  this	  conclusion	  go	  wrong?	  This	  is	  a	  hard	  question.	  Let	  me	  put	  an	  answer	  on	  the	  table.	  If	  Eve	  takes	  all	  the	  slices	  then	  she	  is	  not	  an	  appropriate	  subject	  of	  rational	  criticism.	  Rational	  criticism	  is,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  criticism	  of	  reasoning.	  When	  I	  rationally	  criticize	  you	  for	  acting,	  or	  failing	  to	  act,	  a	  certain	  way,	  I	  indirectly	  criticize	  you	  for	  the	  reasoning	  that	  led	  you	  to	  decide,	  or	  fail	  to	  decide,	  to	  act	  that	  way.v	  And	  the	  criticism	  of	  your	  action	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  criticism	  of	  your	  reasoning.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  appropriate	  rational	  criticism:	  	  
Decision-­‐Governed	  Accountability	  You	  are	  appropriately	  rationally	  criticized	  for	  acting,	  or	  failing	  to	  act,	  a	  certain	  way	  only	  if	  there	  is	  some	  time	  at	  which,	  if	  you	  were	  to	  decide	  at	  that	  time	  to	  act	  that	  way,	  then	  you	  would	  act	  that	  way.	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  But	  there	  is	  no	  time	  such	  that	  if	  Eve	  had	  decided	  at	  that	  time	  to	  take	  finitely	  many	  slices	  then	  she	  would	  have	  taken	  finitely	  many	  slices.	  By	  hypothesis	  her	  later	  decisions	  were	  causally	  isolated	  from	  her	  earlier	  decisions.vi	  	  	  	   And	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  you	  in	  the	  Two	  Courses	  of	  Treatment	  case.	  If	  you	  accept	  both	  deals	  then	  we	  cannot	  rationally	  criticize	  you	  for	  failing	  to	  decline	  both	  deals,	  because	  there	  was	  never	  a	  time	  such	  that,	  if	  you	  had	  decided	  at	  that	  time	  to	  decline	  both	  deals	  then	  you	  would	  have	  declined	  both	  deals.	  By	  hypothesis	  your	  Wednesday	  decision	  was	  causally	  isolated	  from	  your	  Monday	  decision.	  	  	   	  
6.	  So	  Where	  Does	  this	  Leave	  Us?	  	   In	  brief:	  We	  are	  all	  future-­‐biased	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  own	  bad	  experiences,	  and	  this	  phenomenology	  of	  this	  preference	  is	  quite	  unlike	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  preferences	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  rationally	  optional	  –	  like	  a	  preference	  for	  strawberry	  ice	  cream	  over	  vanilla	  ice	  cream.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  a	  more	  precise	  way	  than	  the	  inchoate	  phenomenology	  may	  warrant,	  it	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  be	  future-­‐biased.	  But,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  numerous	  philosophers,	  it	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  isolate	  good,	  persuasive	  arguments	  that	  support	  or	  undermine	  this	  seeming.	  This	  suggests	  that,	  if	  there	  are	  normative	  facts	  concerning	  future-­‐bias	  they	  are	  brutish	  facts	  –	  facts	  that	  philosophy	  is	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  uncover.	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  i	  Psychologists	  and	  economists	  have	  paid	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  to	  what	  philosophers	  call	  ‘near-­‐bias’	  –	  our	  tendency	  to	  care	  less	  about	  far-­‐future	  goods	  and	  bads	  than	  about	  near-­‐future	  goods	  and	  bads.	  But	  that	  is	  a	  different	  thing.	  ii	  The	  basic	  psychological	  mechanism	  behind	  future-­‐bias	  has	  recently	  received	  some	  attention	  -­‐-­‐	  see	  Caruso,	  Gilbert	  and	  Wilson	  (2008),	  and	  Suhler	  and	  Callender	  forthcoming.	  But	  those	  authors	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  what	  kinds	  of	  disvalued	  events	  are	  objects	  of	  future-­‐bias.	  	  	  iii	  The	  growing	  block	  theory	  of	  time	  (which	  says	  that	  past	  events	  exist,	  future	  events	  do	  not)	  has	  had	  some	  supporters.	  See	  C.D.	  Broad	  Scientific	  Thought,	  Harcourt	  Brace	  and	  Co.	  1923,	  and	  Michael	  Tooley	  
Time,	  Tense	  and	  Causation,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  1997.	  But	  there	  is	  at	  least	  something	  that	  might	  be	  said	  for	  it	  –	  it	  somehow	  bears	  out	  our	  inchoate	  idea	  that	  the	  future	  is	  open	  and	  the	  past	  closed.	  iv	  A	  similar	  sort	  of	  worry	  arises	  for	  distant-­‐stranger	  benevolence	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  Lewisian	  modal	  realism	  is	  true.	  If	  modal	  realism	  is	  true	  then	  my	  desire	  that	  distant	  strangers	  not	  starve	  amounts	  to	  a	  preference	  that	  I	  be	  non-­‐worldmate	  related	  to	  starving	  strangers.	  Buy	  why	  care	  about	  that?	  It	  is	  not	  okay	  just	  to	  say	  “it	  matters,	  I	  can’t	  explain	  why.”	  	  vA	  stronger	  view,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  proper	  objects	  of	  rational	  assessment	  are	  decisions,	  not	  
actions,	  has	  recently	  been	  robustly	  defended	  by	  Brian	  Hedden	  –	  (see	  Hedden	  forthcoming).	  vi	  Of	  course,	  as	  Tom	  Dougherty	  has	  pointed	  out,	  this	  entails	  that	  predictable	  exploitability	  is	  not	  always	  a	  mark	  of	  irrationality.	  So,	  if	  we	  take	  this	  line,	  we	  cannot	  say,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  predictable	  exploitability	  of	  people	  with	  intransitive	  preferences	  shows	  them	  to	  be	  irrational.	  That’s	  a	  cost	  we	  must	  bear.	  	  
